December 13, 2008
Terror training schools, teaching hundreds of new and young recruits in suicide missions and the use of sophisticated weapons, have been active in many parts of Pakistan, including Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Waziristan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
Different terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Tayiba, often with the help of former Pakistan army soldiers, run these schools or camps. The syllabus, the training and indoctrination are far more sophisticated than the pre-9/11 training camps.
The terrorists who attacked Mumbai on November 26, 2008, and killed over 160 people were trained in one or two of these schools where several hundred others have been undergoing training for more than two years.
Wilson John, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, reveals how Pakistan's duplicitous policy on terrorism threatens, and will continue to threaten, not only India but also the western world in the years to come.
Reports of the presence of new terrorist training camps in Waziristan and the North West Frontier Province began to appear in the Pakistan media as far back as late 2006, after President Pervez Musharraf signed a peace deal with the Taliban sheltered in these areas.
Herald, a widely read English monthly published by the Dawn group of publications, reported in June 2006 about the fresh recruitment drive launched by the terrorist groups and the sprouting of training camps.
According to the report, at least three major jihadi groups maintain their liaison and recruitment offices in the Timergara area of Lower Dir district. These include the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Al Badr Mujahideen, now re-named as Al Suffa Foundation, and the Lashkar-e-Tayiba, renamed as Jamaat-ud-Dawa.
Other jihadi organisations that have either offices or training camps in the Timergara and Warai areas of Dir include the Jaish-e-Mohammad, which now calls itself Al Rahman Trust, the Harkat-ul-Ansar, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and a Kashmiri group called the Pasban Millat.
Herald reported the presence of more than a thousand trained militants in three camps in the Hazara region of NWFP alone.
At about the same time, Afghan national television reported (October 5, 2006) that the Lashkar was forming suicide-bombing squads to help the Taliban fight the NATO forces and was recruiting Afghan refugees to take up arms against the Afghan government and the NATO forces.
Citing a known case of recruitment, the report said the Lashkar recruits went to the Ahl-e-hadith mosque in the Jalozai refugee camp in Peshawar where the youth were promised training and money if they agreed to join jihad.
The first terrorist leader to acknowledge this development was Jaish-e-Mohammad's Masood Azhar who wrote in his weekly column in an obscure but popular pro-Al Qaeda Urdu weekly, al Qalam, (December 2006) that 'the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are working actively in Kashmir and they are giving the Hindus a tough time'.
He said the 'mujahideen in Kashmir were coming from Dir, North West Frontier Province and it was not possible for Musharraf to stop them'. Upper Dir is one of the northern most districts in the NWFP and borders Chitral, Swat and Malakand districts of the NWFP, in addition to Bajaur Agency in FATA.
How the terror groups get their money
Herald also revealed how official channels funded these groups. Smaller outfits like Tehrik-e-Mujahideen, Jamiat-e-Mujahideen, Al Fatah, Al Jihad, Tehrik-e-Jihad and Islamic Front, received between Rs 400,000 and 700,000 a month.
Bigger ones such as HM, Lashkar, JeM and others received between Rs 2 million and 3 million a month. This 'official funding' was in addition to funds that were paid for logistics, communications, equipment, weapons, and explosives.
The complicity of the State became clear when some terrorist groups were allowed to resurface in April 2008. An American policy research group, Stratfor, quoting the Dawn newspaper, said members of Kashmiri terrorist groups like HuM, al Badr and JeM were 'setting up new offices, changing their names, putting up flags and posters, holding large rallies, and delivering sermons in mosques to publicise the groups' activities'. HuM relocated itself from Islamabad to the outskirts of Rawalpindi and called itself Ansar-ul Ummah. These developments, Stratfor said, could mean 'ISI return to commissioning attacks in Kashmir', part of a new phase in its militant proxy saga.
ISI's linkages with these groups, and the training camps, were reported in detail in the Pakistan media as far back as 2003. Herald (July 2003) documented how, after their training, the new jihadi recruits were 'sent to the ISI which provides trekking kits, communication equipment and weapons for shipment across the LoC. Finally the team goes through the Pakistan army posts which offer them rest and food on their way in as well as out'.
A serious indictment of Pakistan's complicity came in the UN report on Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, an analysis of suicide bombings between 2001 and 2007. The report pointed at the 'training camps sprouting in and around the heavily forested Shawat region in North Waziristan and the Pakistani Taliban recruiting, training, raising money'.
The report also took issue with Pakistan's 'willingness to tolerate attitudes that encourage and justify the use of suicide attacks' and cited several instances.
Lashkar, which renamed itself as Jamaat-ud Dawa on the advice of the ISI, has been actively recruiting its cadres and training them in several schools and camps even after the global crackdown on such groups repeatedly after the September 11 attacks.
The terror campus that churns out jihadis
While Muridke, near Lahore, was the hub of Lashkar's terrorist activities till 2002, (and has since been widely documented), the terrorist group moved its operations to several other camps, located in PoK, NWFP and Sindh. Of these, least known but a highly structured extensive training facility is the one called Markaz Mohammad bin Qasim, set up near Shehdadopur, not far from Hyderabad city in Sindh.
The Qasim complex is one of the four training centres which Lashkar has been busy setting up in Sindh.
Four plots have already been bought in Hyderabad division and six in other parts of Sindh for about Rs 200 million. A 20,000 square feet plot of land has been bought on Khoasi Road, Badin, for Rs 50 lakh.
Another 43,000 sq ft has been acquired in Mitali for Rs 1crore and a new madrasa is under construction on Hala Road, Hyderabad city. Similarly, another plot has been bought in Tando Allan Yar to set up another complex.
But it is the Markaz Mohammad bin Qasim at Maldasi in Shahdadpur, near Hyderabad, which merits a closer scrutiny. Built like a fortress, it was here that jihadi recruits underwent a 21-day training camp which used to be held every month (between the fifth and 26th of each month) before the crackdown in late 2002.
The training course began with indoctrinating the new recruits with the importance and virtues of jihad. In the last week of their training, the recruits were sent out to nearby cities and towns to spread the message of Islam, promote civic sense, preach social responsibility and equality among people.
Throughout this period, their performance, ability to gather and influence people and public-speaking skills were monitored and evaluated by their mentors. It was part of the Lashkar strategy-before a recruit qualified to be a Mujahideen, he had to prove his worth as a citizen. Those who qualified were then declared fit to apply for guerrilla training at the Lashkar's camps in PoK where they were taught all about weapons, from their use and firepower to their origin and manufacturing.
Humanitarian cloak for terror's whiz kids
The military training, which was mandatory, and held quite openly before 9/11, trained recruits in 'infantry tactics and small arms -- from handguns to assault rifles; rocket-propelled grenade launchers and shoulder-fired Surface to Air Missiles like the Stingers'.
Pakistani expert Arif Jamal said the jihadis 'usually follow a basic military course of 21 days to get minimum training in Kalashnikov handling, hand grenades, ambushing. You come back to get advanced training only when you are planning to practically wage jihad. Even those who have minimum guerrilla training are better fighters than the Pakistani policemen.'
Some of the training, organised at the Umar Kuka camp and the Abu Bashir camp in Bahawalpur in Punjab, included physical exercises, theory and practice of making bombs, guerrilla warfare and escape and interrogation methods. Lashkar was the first terrorist group to introduce suicide attacks in Kashmir.
The recruits were also trained to 'use all means of communication including short messaging services on mobile phones, chatting through the Internet, central messaging through bulletin boards on the net and electronic messaging. In these training classes, recruits were told to communicate with each other through word of mouth instead of mobiles as often as possible. If mobiles were used, then the sets were to be dismantled once the conversation was over.
They also were told to make mobile conversations at crowded locations like commercial centres where 'it is difficult for the security agencies to isolate them and listen in to their conversation to detect their whereabouts.'
There is also evidence of Lashkar training its recruits in amphibious operations. Well-known American scholar Steve Coll (author of Ghost Wars), wrote in the New Yorker on December 1, 2008, that 'under the guise of humanitarian relief operations, Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. Lashkar has rubber pontoon boats about 15ft long with a large outboard motor also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian Kashmir.' The terrorists who attacked Mumbai could also have been trained there.
Lashkar second-in-command, Abdur Rahman Makki, wrote in his book on suicide missions, Tareek-e-Islam Kay Fadayee Dastay, that 'it can be safely said that a fidayee action is not suicide, it is not killing oneself. It is only a style of fighting. Now-a-days, we hear of Lashkar-e-Tayiba mujahideen carrying out fidayee actions and returning safely by the blessing of Allaah Al-Mighty. The fidayee from Sargodha who carried out the 15 Corps Badami Bagh Srinagar fidayee action, Mujahid Salahud Din who led the fidayee attack at Srinagar airport and those who conducted the attack on the Delhi Red Fort, all returned safely after accomplishing their mission.'
Notes from a terrorist's manual
An insight into the methodology of training suicide bombers can be gained from the 24-page Hidayatnama, or user's manual. 'To become a martyr,' the manual says, 'is the dream of every mujahid. It is a gift from God and will also send a message to the enemy that the mujahid would prefer to die in an interrogation cell rather than disclose any secrets which could harm other mujahids'.
The manual, seized from a suicide bomber in Pakistan, contains instructions for training and how to deal with interrogators if arrested. The first chapter begins with a stress on the need for 'collective restraint' and says 'every mujahideen should try not to divulge his personal problems to others in the organisation. Gathering information other than that required should also be avoided. Mujahideen should only move according to instructions from the centre'.
The second chapter focuses on 'personal constraint' and, advising jihadis to avoid keeping photographs and secret documents, warns 'you should try not to tell your family members about your whereabouts and also avoid meeting them as this could land you in trouble. Our relation is with God, whatever we are doing is for God, and all other relationships are meaningless. Therefore, try to avoid making friends and keeping in close touch with your relatives'.
Other chapters instruct the jihadis about keeping secrets, how to meet people in public places, and not to argue with the traffic police. One chapter details how to avoid using the Internet and mobile phones to communicate with each other. 'Every friend should avoid opening any Internet site that could land you in trouble or help others find out about your ideology or strategy like what happened with Al Qaeda. Always use a cafe for chatting or sending messages on the e-mail, but avoid sending e-mails from your own home or a friend's house. Similarly, first write your message on Note Pad or WordPad'.
What to do when you get arrested
An important chapter in the manual gives detailed instructions about what to do if arrested. 'If any friend (jihadis are referred to as friends in the manual) gets into trouble he must remember one thing: Police or interrogators will give you the impression that they know everything about you, your organisation and other friends but, in reality, they know nothing so don't fall into their trap. You have to remain very composed, particularly when the interrogators threaten to harm your parents or sisters. They can use all kind of methods, but you are answerable only to God, so never betray your friends or the future plans of the organisation. Never give detailed answers and avoid unnecessary information. Try to confuse them about your friends. Never be afraid to die, even when interrogators threaten you with death or put you in front of a firing squad. These are mere threats and then, remember, you are a mujahid, and whatever you are doing is for the cause of your religion.'
Saeed's group, despite the ban on JuD's assets by the US Treasury Department, was openly soliciting funds for jihad through its weekly, Ghazwa. In an advertisement, the group sought Ushr from farmers. Islamic customs urge farmers to keep aside a 20th of his wheat crop for charity, Ushr. JuD said Ushr was needed to support jihad in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq. 'Your Ushr will support mujahideen, their widows, their families, etc. It will also be used in buying weapons for mujahideen,' ran the ad.
In June 2008, Saeed was quite actively promoting the cause of jihad from his mosque in Lahore. 'Jihad is not terrorism. It is the biggest source of establishing peace on earth. The state of the world's affairs is changing rapidly because of the sacrifices offered by the Muslims. The Muslims must remain steadfast.'
This brief is largely drawn from the author's yet-to-be published Coming Blowback: How Pakistan is Endangering the World. He can be contacted at wjohn@orfonline.org
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